Parsimony, Evolution, and Animal Pain by Rosenfeld, Robert P.
P a r s i m o n y ,  E v o l u t i o n ,  
a n d  A n i m a l  P a i n  
R o b e r t  P .  R o s e n f e l d  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M a s s a c h u s e t t s  
B o s t o n  
E d i t o r s '  N o t e :  T h i s  p a p e r  b y  P r o f e s s o r  

R o s e n f e l d ,  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  c o m m e n t a r y  b y  

D a v i d  B o o n i n - V a l l  a n d  R o s e n f e l d ' s  r e p l y  t o  

i t ,  w e r e  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  E a s t e r n  D i v i s i o n  

m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  S o c i e t y  f o r  t h e  S t u d y  o f  

E t h i c s  a n d  A n i m a l s ,  h e l d  i n  N e w  Y o r k  C i t y ,  

N e w  Y o r k ,  D e c e m b e r ,  1 9 9 2 .  

P e t e r  H a r r i s o n ,  i n  t w o  a r t i c l e s ,  " T h e o d i c y  a n d  
A n i m a l  P a i n , "  a n d  " D o  A n i m a l s  F e e l  P a i n ? , "  a r g u e s  
f o r  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  a n i m a l s  d o  n o t  f e e l  p a i n .  I n  d o i n g  
s o ,  H a r r i s o n  a t t a c k s  t w o  m a j o r  t y p e s  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  m e n t a l  p a i n  s t a t e s  i n  a n i m a l s :  
1 .  	 t h e  c o m b i n e d  a n a l o g i c a l  a r g u m e n t  f r o m  

c o m m o n  p a i n - b e h a v i o r  a n d  i t s  a s s o c i a t e d  

n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y ,  a n d  

2 .  t h e  e v o l u t i o n a r y  a r g u m e n t  f r o m  t h e  a d a p t i v e  

u s e f u l n e s s  o f  m e n t a l  p a i n  s t a t e s  i n  e n a b l i n g  

a n i m a l s  t o  r e s p o n d  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  t o  i n j u r y .  

I  w i l l  f r r s t  i n d i c a t e - b r i e f l y - t h e  m a j o r  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  
H a r r i s o n ' s  f r r s t  l i n e  o f  c r i t i c i s m ,  a n d  w h y  h i s  s e c o n d  
l i n e  o f  a r g u m e n t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  h i s  p o s i t i o n .  I  w i l l  
f o c u s  t h e  m a j o r  p o r t i o n  o f  m y  a t t e n t i o n  o n  a  c r i t i c i s m  
o f  H a r r i s o n ' s  s e c o n d  l i n e  o f  a t t a c k ,  i n  w h i c h  h e  t u r n s  
t h e  e v o l u t i o n a r y  a r g u m e n t  a r o u n d ,  a r g u i n g  t h a t  m e n t a l  
p a i n  s t a t e s  c o u l d  n o t  h a v e  e v o l v e d  i n  a n i m a l s .  I  w i l l  
a r g u e  t h a t  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  b a s e d  o n  d u b i o u s  a p p e a l s  t o  
p a r s i m o n y ,  o n  a n  e x c e s s i v e l y  " a d a p t a t i o n i s t "  v i e w  o f  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y ,  a n d  o n  q u e s t i o n a b l e  c l a i m s  a b o u t  
w h a t  m e n t a l  c a p a c i t i e s  o f a n i m a l s  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  m a k e  
p a i n  a  f e a t u r e  o f  a n i m a l  l i f e .  W h i l e  H a r r i s o n ' s  
a r g u m e n t s  r a i s e  d o u b t s  a b o u t  w h e t h e r  a n i m a l s  f e e l  p a i n ,  
s u c h  d o u b t s  a r e  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s t r o n g  t o  o u t w e i g h  t h e  
m o r a l  c o s t s  o f j u d g i n g  w r o n g l y  a g a i n s t  a n i m a l s .  F o r  a  
s t r o n g e r  c a s e ,  g e n u i n e l y  p o s i t i v e  e v i d e n c e  f r o m  
n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  p r i o r i  t h e o r i z i n g  f r o m  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  b i o l o g y ,  w i l l  b e  r e q u i r e d .  
H a r r i s o n  a t t a c k s  t h e  c o m b i n e d  a n a l o g i c a l  a r g u m e n t  
o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  s k e p t i c i s m  a b o u t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
b e t w e e n  n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y ,  b e h a v i o r ,  a n d  m e n t a l  s t a t e s .  
S i n c e  s t u d i e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  
n e u r a l  s t r u c t u r e s  a n d  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  a r e  n o t  n e a r l y  a s  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  a s  o n c e  b e l i e v e d ,  o n e  c a n n o t ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  H a r r i s o n ,  a p p e a l  t o  s i m i l a r i t i e s  i n  h u m a n  
a n d  a n i m a l  n e u r a l  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  f u n c t i o n  t o  s u p p o r t  
t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  h u m a n s  a n d  a n i m a l s  h a v e  s i m i l a r  
m e n t a l  p a i n  s t a t e s .  
1  
A  m a j o r  w e a k n e s s  o f  t h i s  k i n d  o f s k e p t i c a l  r e s p o n s e  
i s  t h a t  i t  c a n  a l s o  b e  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  o u r  
f e l l o w  h u m a n s  f e e l  p a i n .  H a r r i s o n ' s  p r o b l e m  t h e n  i s  t o  
j u s t i f y  t h e  a s c r i p t i o n  o f  m e n t a l  p a i n  s t a t e s  t o  h u m a n s  
b u t  n o t  t o  a n i m a l s .
2  
H a r r i s o n  m i g h t  t r y  t o  b a s e  a  c a s e  
f o r  t h i s  o n  t h e  d i s a n a l o g i e s  b e t w e e n  h u m a n  a n d  a n i m a l  
n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  i n v o l v i n g  n e o ­
c o r t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  m i g h t  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  p a i n .  
H o w e v e r ,  H a r r i s o n  d o e s  n o t  d o  t h i s ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t  
b e c a u s e  h i s  s k e p t i c i s m  a b o u t  s u c h  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i t s e l f  
s e e m s  t o  d i s a l l o w  i t .  I t  w o u l d  b e  i r o n i c  f o r  s p e c i e s i s t s  
i f s u c h  s k e p t i c i s m  e n d e d  u p  d i s m i s s i n g  s o m e  o f  t h e  b e s t  
e v i d e n c e  w e  m i g h t  h a v e  f o r  h u m a n  s u p e r i o r i t y .  
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Another problem is that some ofHarrison's skeptical 
evidence can be usedjust as readily against his position 
as in support of it. Harrison cites, for example, the case 
of "thin-brained" human individuals, whose skulls are 
mostly fluid-filled space, with a thin layer ofbrain tissue 
pressed against the skull. Many of these individuals, 
far from being "vegetables," seem to have normal 
cognitive abilities, and are of apparently nonnal, or 
above normal, intelligence.3 He also notes the ability 
of birds to "see" in spite of the fact that they have no 
region of their brain corresponding to our visual cortex. 
In fact, the neurophysiological architecture associated 
with their vision is quite different from ours. 4 However, 
such cases could justas well support the possibility that 
animals with tiny brains, or with very different brains 
from ours, feel pain.5 If we combine this possibility 
with the moral argument for giving animals the benefit 
of the doubt, we might need to give this benefit to 
roaches and flatworms as well as to apes and rabbits. 
This moral benefit ofdoubt enters here because the 
skeptical argument is, in the end, neutral concerning 
the existence ofmental pain states in animals. Animals 
might feel pain or they might not. A morally isolated 
epistemology might lead us to prefer non-mentalist 
parsimony here. As moral agents, however, we must 
consider the costs ofbeing wrong: ifwe are to be wrong, 
it is better to err on the side of kindness than on that of 
cruelty. Although this position cannot be accepted 
without qualification, I will pass over such qualification, 
both because of limited space and because Harrison in 
fact recognizes its force, using it as part of the reason 
for pursuing his other line of argument.6 
In an effort to justify denying pain to animals but 
not to humans, and to provide a positive argument 
against the existence of animal pain that is sufficiently 
strong to counteract the moral benefit ofdoubt, Harrison 
resorts to evolutionary theory. According to Harrison, 
evolution would not favor the development of mental 
pain states except in a being capable ofdetermining its 
action on the basis of reasons rather than instincts or 
reflexes. Furthermore, only a being capable ofmaking 
free choices can act on the basis of reasons. Since 
humans, but not animals, base their actions on reasons­
since humans, but not animals, make free choices-it 
is only in humans that the evolution ofmentalpain states 
constitutes a reasonable evolutionary development or 
adaptation. For Harrison, mental pain states serve a 
necessary function only as a "voice of the body in the 
deliberations of the mind, and only in a being that can 
overrule the body's demands in favor of consciously 
chosen objectives.? 
Harrison's case can be attacked in two ways: First, 
one can aigue that animals do in fact act on the basis 
of reasons, and that they do make free choices. 
Alternatively, one can argue against the need for a 
connection between reason-based choice and pain. I will 
pursue the latter path here, since that focuses on 
Harrison's misuses of the notion of parsimony and the 
theory of evolution. 
Hairison depends on appeals to several kinds of 
parsimony in his argument. One kind he draws upon is 
that of C. Lloyd Morgan, who held that we should not 
explain behavior in terms of"higher psychical faculties" 
when explanations in terms of "lower psychical 
faculties" suffice. 8 It seems clear from what Harrison 
has said that he considers pain to be a "higher" faculty, 
rather than the primitive "raw feel'' that some of us 
might think it is, an assessment that has found support 
from studies showing that there is a large cognitive 
component to human pain perception.9 
Harrison also appears at times to endorse the position 
that we should not explain animal behavior in terms of 
mental states wben purely physical--or behavioristic­
explanations would suffice. 10 This certainly seems true 
of his attitude toward animal pain behavior, which 
Harrison feels can be adequately explained by reflexes 
and noumentalistic behavioral principles. It could also 
be applied, and has been applied by many workers, to 
support a general denial ofconscious states in animals.11 
It is not clear to me why Harrison does not go all the 
way with this, and deny the existence ofconsciousness 
in animals, notjustmental pain states. In fact, in one of 
his articles, he proposes, although with minimal 
justification, a temporally-fragmented consciousness 
for animals. 12 This generosity may be important­
given the existence of animal consciousness, the 
evolutionary usefulness of pain is very defensible, as 
we will see shortly. 
The two kinds of parsimony mentioned so far can 
be invoked independently of evolutionary theory. An 
application of two additional parsimony principles (to 
be mentioned shortly) will yield Harrison's evolutionary 
position: Since pain is not a necessary feature of 
animals' consciousness, either for their actual adaptation 
to their life needs (i.e. for their survival and repro­
duction), or for our explaining their behavior, then it is 
not reasonable to suppose that they feel pain. Notice 
that this kind of argument call be raised against any 
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P a r s i m o n y ,  E v o l u t i o n ,  a n d  A n i m a l  P a i n  
f e a t u r e  o f  a n i m a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  n o t  j u s t  a n i m a l  p a i n .  
T h i s  c a n  b e  s e e n  u p o n  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
" e v o l u t i o n a r y  p a r s i m o n y "  p r i n c i p l e s :  
1 .  I f a  f e a t u r e  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  
a d a p t i v e  b e h a v i o r  o f  a n  o r g a n i s m ,  t h e n  o n e  s h o u l d  
n o t  i n f e r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h a t  f e a t u r e ;  a n d  
2 .  I f a  f e a t u r e  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  f o r  a n  o r g a n i s m •  s  s u r v i v a l  
a n d  r e p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e n  i t  w i l l  n o t  a r i s e  t h r o u g h  
e v o l u t i o n ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  w i l l  n o t  b e c o m e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n  t h a t  o r g a n i s m ' s  e v o l u t i o n a r y  l i n e a g e .  
N o t e  t h a t  t h e  s e c o n d  p r i n c i p l e  i s  n o t  a n  e p i s t e ­
m o l o g i c a l  p a r s i m o n y  c l a i m ;  i t  i s  a  c l a i m  a b o u t  h o w  
e v o l u t i o n  i n  f a c t  w o r k s ,  a n d  t h e  f m t  p r i n c i p l e  m a y  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  i t s  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  d e r i v a t i v e .  T h i s  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  p a r s i m o n y  r e p r e s e n t s  a n  " a d a p t a t i o n i s t "  
a p p r o a c h  t o  e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y ,  w h i c h  h a s  c o m e  u n d e r  
s e r i o u s  c h a l l e n g e  i n  t h e  p a s t  d e c a d e  a n d  a  h a l f P  T h e  
s p e c i f i c  t y p e  o f  a d a p t a t i o n i s m  o n  w h i c h  H a r r i s o n ' s  
p o s i t i o n  d e p e n d s  i s ,  I  b e l i e v e ,  a n  e x c e s s i v e l y  s t r o n g  
o n e - a  c l a i m  t h a t  o r g a n i s m s  i n  e v o l u t i o n a r y  l i n e a g e s  
w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  f m d  t h e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  w a y s  t o  a d a p t  
t h e m s e l v e s  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a s  i f o r g a n i s m s  
w e r e  i n f i n i t e l y  m a l l e a b l e  a d a p t a t i o n  m a c h i n e s .  B e f o r e  
c r i t i c i z i n g  H a r r i s o n ' s  p o s i t i o n  o n  t h i s  b a s i s ,  I  w i l l  p o i n t  
o u t  t w o  w a y s  i n  w h i c h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  p a r s i m o n y  c a n  
s u p p o r t  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  a n i m a l s  d o  f e e l  p a i n .  
A  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  w a y  i n  w h i c h  p a r s i m o n y  c a n  b e  
i n v o k e d  t o  s u p p o r t  a  c a s e  f o r  a n i m a l  p a i n  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
S i n c e  a n i m a l s  h a v e  t h e  s a m e  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  p r o d u c e  
p a i n  i n  h u m a n s ,  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  a n i m a l s  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  
d o  n o t  f e e l  p a i n  m u s t  i n v o k e  a d d i t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  t o  
a c c o u n t  f o r  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e .  I t  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  
p a r s i m o n i o u s  t o  u s e  a n  a c c o u n t  i n  w h i c h  s u c h  e x t r a  
p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  n o t  r e q u i r e d ;  n a m e l y ,  o n e  i n  w h i c h  s i m i l a r  
c a u s e s  p r o d u c e  s i m i l a r  e f f e c t s  a n d  i n  w h i c h  a n i m a l s ,  
l i k e  h u m a n s ,  f e e l  p a i n .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  b u r d e n  o f  p r o o f  
w o u l d  b e  o n  p a i n  o p p o n e n t s  t o  f i n d  r e l e v a n t  
d i s a n a l o g i e s  b e t w e e n  h u m a n  a n d  a n i m a l  c a s e s .  
O n e  c a n  a l s o  u s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  p a r s i m o n y  t o  
s u p p o r t  a  c a s e  f o r  c o n s c i o u s  s t a t e s  i n  g e n e r a l ,  a s  D o n a l d  
G r i f f i n  h a s  a t t e m p t e d  t o  d o .  H e  h a s  a r g u e d .  w i t h  l i m i t e d  
s u c c e s s ,  t h a t s o m e  p a t t e r n s  o f b e h a v i o r ,  a n d  t h e  i n t r i c a c i e s  
o f  p r o c e s s i n g  d e m a n d e d  b y  s o m e  b e h a v i o r a l  t a s k s ,  a r e  
s o  c o m p l e x  t h a t  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  c o u l d  a c t u a l l y  b e  a  m o r e  
e f f i c i e n t m e c h a n i s m  f o r  t h e s e  t h a n  m a d e - f o r - t h e - o c c a s i o n  
n e u r o l o g i c a l  c i r c u i t r y .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  G r i f f i n :  
I t  m a y  b e  h e l p f u l ,  a n d  e v e n  p a r s i m o n i o u s ,  t o  
a s s u m e  s o m e  l i m i t e d  d e g r e e  o f  c o n s c i o u s  
a w a r e n e s s  i n  a n i m a l s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  p o s t u l a t i n g  
c u m b e r s o m e  c h a i n s  o f  i n t e r a c t i n g  r e f l e x e s  a n d  
i n t e r n a l  s t a t e s  o f  m o t i v a t i o n .  
1 4  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  a n i m a l s  f e e l  p a i n  m a y  
n o t  b e  s t r i c t l y  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e i r  b e h a v i o r ,  i t  
d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  f r o m  t h i s  t h a t  p a i n  c o u l d  n o t  b e  a n  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  a d a p t a t i o n .  T h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  q u e s t i o n  i n  
a d a p t i v e  e v o l u t i o n a r y  t e r m s  i s :  I s  p a i n  t h e  b e s t  a v a i l a b l e  
o p t i o n ,  o r  w a s  i t t h e  b e s t  a v a i l a b l e  o n e  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  
i n  w h i c h  i t  a r o s e ?  I s  ( o r  w a s )  i t .  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  m o r e  
e f f i c i e n t  i n  " n e u r o l o g i c a l  e c o n o m y "  t o  h a v e  a  
m e c h a n i s m  t o  c r e a t e  a  f e e l i n g  o f p a i n ,  o r  i n s t e a d  t o  h a v e  
a  s e t  o f  r e f l e x e s  r e a d y - m a d e  o r  d e v e l o p e d  f o r  e v e r y  
o c c a s i o n ?  I t  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  ( a n d  m i g h t  s t i l l  b e )  
a d v a n t a g e o u s  f o r  p a i n  t o  b e  t h e  c a u s e  o f  a n  a c t i o n ,  n o t  
m e r e l y  a n  e x t r a .  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  u n n e c e s s a r y ,  c a u s e .  I f  
o n e  g r a n t s  t h e  a d a p t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a s  
t h e  a r e n a  f o r  a t  l e a s t  s o m e  a n i m a l  d e c i s i o n s - w h e t h e r  
t h e  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  a u t o m a t i c  o r  n o t - t h e n  p a i n  c a n  s e r v e  
w i t h i n  t h i s  a r e n a  a s  t h e  " v o i c e  o f  t h e  b o d y . "  P a i n ,  i n  
t h i s  a c c o u n t ,  w o u l d  n o t  r e q u i r e  t h a t  a n i m a l s  m a k e  " f r e e ' '  
c h o i c e s .  I  s a y  t h i s  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o n e  m a y  
c h a l l e n g e  H a r r i s o n ' s  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  a n i m a l s  d o  n o t  
c h o o s e  f r e e l y ,  a s  w e l l  a s  h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  h u m a n s  
d o  c h o o s e  f r e e l y .  
P a i n  m a y  n o t  b e  t h e  m o s t  e f f i c i e n t  w a y  t o  m a k e  a n  
a n i m a l  b e h a v e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y .  H o w e v e r ,  e v o l u t i o n  d o e s  
n o t  a l w a y s  p r o d u c e  t h e  a b s o l u t e l y  b e s t  o r  m o s t  e f f i c i e n t  
a d a p t a t i o n ,  b u t  o n l y  t h e  b e s t  o r  m o s t  e f f i c i e n t  o n e  g i v e n  
t h e  m a t e r i a l  a v a i l a b l e  ( i . e .  h e r i t a b l e  p h y s i c a l  f e a t u r e s  
a n d  g e n e t i c  v a r i a n c e  o f  s u c h  f e a t u r e s ) .  E v o l u t i o n  d o e s  
n o t  m o l d  c r e a t u r e s  f r e e l y ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  o p e r a t e s  w i t h i n  
t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  g e n e t i c  e n d o w m e n t  a n d  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
o f  d e v e l o p m e n t a l  s y s t e m s  i n h e r i t e d  f r o m  e v o l u t i o n a r y  
f o r b e a r s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  w e  b r e a t h e  i n  a n d  o u t ,  w i t h  a n  
i n e f f i c i e n t  t i d a l  r e s p i r a t i o n  s y s t e m  t h a t  w a s t e s  m o s t  o f  
t h e  o x y g e n  w e  t a k e  i n  a n d  t h a t  v o i d s  c a r b o n  d i o x i d e  
r a t h e r  p o o r l y .  I t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  t h a n  t h e  " f l o w ­
t h r o u g h "  r e s p i r a t o r y  s y s t e m  o f  b i r d s .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  h a d  
t o  s e t t l e  f o r  w h a t  w e  r e c e i v e d - a n d  w e r e  s t u c k  w i t h ­
f r o m  t h e  t h e r a p s i d  r e p t i l e  f o r b e a r s .  B i r d s ,  w h o  h a v e  
a p p a r e n t l y  d e s c e n d e d  f r o m  a  d i f f e r e n t  l i n e a g e - t h a t  o f  
t h e  d i n o s a u r s - w e r e  n o t  s o  c o n s t r a i n e d .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  p a i n  m i g h t  b e  " t h e  b e s t  w e  h i g h e r  a n i m a l s  
c o u l d  g e t . "  A  r e f l e x - g e n e r a t i o n  s y s t e m  m i g h t  b e  t h e  
m o s t  e f f i c i e n t  m e c h a n i s m  o f  a d a p t a t i o n  f o r  a  r o b o t ,  
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Parsimony, Evolution, and Animal Pain 
which we can design from the start or by modifying 
another robot. It may not have been the most efficient 
way, however, for a lineage of our vertebrate ancestors 
that had inherited their neuroanatomy from primitive 
placoderm fish or lancelet-like chordate ancestors. 
It may help at this point to distinguish two versions 
of the second evolutionary parsimony principle, based 
primarily on different substitutions for the expression, 
'not required~' In one case, 'not required' is identified 
with 'useless'; in the other case, it is identified with 
'not the best possible way' (in which case a feature is 
not required because a better alternative is available). 
This gives us the following: 
2a) Ifa feature is useless for promoting an organism's 
survival and reproduction, then it will not become 
established in that organism's evolutionary lineage. 
2b) If a feature is not the best possible way of 
promoting an organism's survival and reproduction, 
then it will either not become established in that 
organism's evolutionary lineage, or will bereplaced 
by a better alternative. 
Principle 2b is the one that has been under attack 
here. However, principle 2a is comparatively reasonable 
(in spite of the fact that it is not true without some 
qualification15), and when people assent to the second 
evolutionary parsimony principle as originally stated, 
they are likely to have something like 2a in mind. 
Harrison would have a much stronger case ifpain were 
actually useless as an adaptation, as itwouldbe in plants, 
for example, since they cannot take action to remove 
themselves from the dangers that would be signaled by 
pain. Because pain would in fact have no benefit in 
such a case we would not expect it to be preserved in 
evolution.16 I will note here that one of the reasons why 
Harrison can turn the tables on the adaptive-evolutionary 
argument for animal pain is that such an argument 
actually presents a much stronger negative case against 
pain in plants, and in sessile animals such as sponges, 
than it does a positive case for pain in animals. 
Pain is certainly not useless for animals, and it is 
conceivable that it either is the best way to promote 
appropriate danger-avoidance behavior or was the best 
available such way during a crucial period in early 
vertebrate evolution. However, is it true that it either is 
or was the best available such option? We don't know. 
In order to know we need to know much more about 
the neurophysiology associated with conscious pain 
states, and perhaps that associated with states of 
consciousness in general. Until we do so, we cannot 
tell whether consciousness is more efficient than "hard­
wired" adaptations, because we do not yet now exactly 
what it is we are comparing. To evaluate the 
evolutionary claims we would need further information 
on the evolution ofneural structure and its genetic basis. 
I am aware, of course, that I may be grossly 
understating the enormity and complexity of such 
tasks. Ne·,;ertheless, support for Harrison's position 
seems to require tackling them, since evolution works 
not on isolated mental states, but on the physical ones 
that produce or modify them, and only ones that are 
under genetic controL 
Given our ignorance in such matters, and given 
the inability of a priori evolutionary theorizing and 
appeals to parsimony to settle the question of animal 
pain, the moral benefit of doubt in favor of animals 
should prevail. This does not mean that we must 
assume that animals such as flatworms, jellyfish and 
barnacles feel pain, or that they feel it as fully as we 
do. But it means that we must be willing to accept the 
uncertainty that is involved in dealing with a complex 
combination of neurophysiological, behavioral, and 
evolutionary evidence, and that we be willing to fall 
into occasional anthropomorphic error. And one may 
even change one's mind, as has Peter Singer, who once 
drew the line "somewhere between a shrimp and an 
oyster" but has since removed bivalve mollusks from 
his diet, although this is in part because "it is so easy 
to avoid eating them."17 
It also means that those who wish to deny the 
existence or the magnitude of pain in animals, either 
specifically or in general, have the burden-as well as 
the opportunity-of identifying disanalogies between 
human states and animal states that would support such 
claims. It is quite possible that the conclusions of such 
studies will be highly unfriendly to those who wish to 
protect animals. However, such studies will have to be 
empirical-andoften more messy and inconclusive than 
anyone would like-rather than a prioristic. We must 
look to the animals, not just to the theories of those 
such as Darwin and Lloyd Morgan. 
Notes 
1Peter Harrison, "Theodicy and Animal Pain," Philosophy 
64:79-92(1989), p. 87; "Do Animals Feel Pain?," Philosophy 
66:25-40 (1991), pp. 28-31. 
Between the Species 136 Summer 1993 
Parsimony, Evolution, and Animal Pain 
2 Harrison, "Theodicy and Animal Pain," p. 85. 
3 Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain?," p. 29. 
4 /bid.. p 30 
5 Marian Dawkins writes, for example: "To say that birds 
do not suffer because their brains are different from those of 
mammals is like stating that a jet airplane cannot fly because 
it has no propellers. Different anatomical structures can serve 
the same function ..." (from "Author's Response," Brain and 
Behavioral Science 13:49-54, p. 50). 
6 Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain?," p. 35. 
7 Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain?," pp. 36, 38; 
"Theodicy and Animal Pain," p. 84. 
8 Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain?," p. 34. 
9 Harrison, "Theodicy and Animal Pain," p. 86. 
10 Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain?," p. 36. 
11 Donald Griffin's works, The Question of Animal 
Awareness (New York: Rockefeller Univ. Press, 1981) and 
Animal Thinking (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984), 
are directed largely to attacking the anti-mentalist bias that 
he saw among ethologists and psychologists. 
12 Harrison, "Theodicy and Animal Pain," pp. 88-91. 
13 See, for example, Stephen J. Gould and Richard C. 
Lewontin, "The Spandrels ofSan Marcos and the Panglossian 
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme," 
Proceedings of the Royal Society ofLondon B205:581-598, 
1979. 
14 Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, p. 145. 
See also Animal Thinking, p. 40. 
15 The principle is not true as stated because there are 
many features of organisms that have little or no apparent 
adaptive value. (1 consider the issue of what proportion of 
features are nonadaptive to be an open one.) However, if a 
feature has a "cost" or disadvantage to it, or if it is likely to 
have had a fairly complex evolutionary development, it is 
reasonable to expect some adaptive function to be present 
to offset whatever disadvantages it may have now or may 
have bad during its development. However, one could still 
be mistaken: In some cases, disadvantageous features may 
simply be genetically or developmentally linked to other 
features that are advantageous. 
16 See, for example, Marian Dawkins' argument in 
"Minding and Mattering," in Mindwaves, eds. C. Blakemore 
and S. Greenfield (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 159. 
17 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon, 
1990) p. 174. 
Response: 

Parsimony Made Simple: 
Rosenfeld on Harrison 
and Animal Pain 
David Boonin-Vail 
Georgetown University 
Peter Harrison stands accused ofmisusing the notion 
ofparsimony.1 He argues2 that we ought not to attribute 
pain states to animals on the grounds that doing so 
would be unparsimonious; the most efficient adaptive 
mechanisms possible for creatures lacking the ability 
to make free, reason-based choices3 would not require 
such states, and on "the simplest application of the 
theory of natural selection,•>4 we should not attribute to 
animals any features which are not required to explain 
their adaptive behavior. Rosenfeld objects that this 
conclusion implicitly presupposes the excessively 
strong claim that organisms always develop the most 
effective adaptive mechanisms possible, rather than the 
more realistic claim that they will tend to develop the 
most effective mechanisms available given the genetic 
material they have to work with. On this more 
reasonable standard, Rosenfeld argues, it remains an 
open possibility that the ability to feel pain (and, I would 
add, pleasure) was the bestmechanism available at some 
important early stage in evolution, and that evolutionary 
theory might thus provide support for the attribution of 
pain to animals after all. 
I want here to initiate the project of assessing the 
case for the prosecution by doing three things: frrst, I 
want to try to clarify the nature of the charge itself, by 
situating Rosenfeld's attack on Harrison's appeal to 
parsimony in this case within the context of a more 
fundamental attack on appeals to parsimony in general. 
DISCUSSION 
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